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Brainwashing is a colloquial term which has been used in reference to the
systematic efforts of the Chinese Communists (and by implication the Soviets)
to persuade non-believers to accept Communist allegiance, commands, and/or doc-
trine by coercive means. More generally, the term has been applied to any
technique designed to manipulate human thought or action against the desire,
will, or knowledge of the individual. The word brainwashing derives from the
Chinese phrase Hsi Nao (Hunter, 1951) and is most appropriately used in refer-
ence to Chinese Communist "thought reform" or "ideological remolding" (Szu
Hsing Kao Tsao), a program of political indoctrination based on the conception
that people who have not been educated in a Communist society have, by defini-
tion, incorrect bourgeois attitudes and beliefs, and must therefore be re-
educated before they can take their place in a Communist society (Lifton, 1956).
Interest in brainwashing on the part of Western observers and scientists
derives from the seemingly successful attempts by the Sovit and Chinese Communist
secret police and army to convert Western military and civilian prisoners. Of
equal interest, however, has been the seeming success of the Soviet secret police
in getting confessions from former high officials of the Communist party as in
the purge trials of the 1930's (Leites & Bernaut, 1954); and of the Chinese Com-
munists in indoctrinating their entire population in the remarkably short time
of 3 to 5 years.
Because of the close connections between Chinese and Soviet Communism and
because of the importance which Soviet psychology seems to attach to the works
*
Much of the material in this review is from a forthcoming publication,
Coercive Persuasion (Schein, 1961). I wish to thank Inge Schneier and Curtis
Barker who were my collaborators in preparing that volume and who therefore
contributed importantly to this paper. This material was prepared for the 1961
World Affairs Yearbook and will appear there in slightly condensed form.
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of Pavlov, the assumption has frequently been made that brainwashing is a highly
refined adaptation of Pavlovian psychology. From this assumption and the image
of scientific mental destruction which it stimulates has come the conception that
brainwashing is a highly dangerous and possibly irresistible weapon against the
mind of man.
Studies of Chinese Communist and Soviet methods of confession extraction
and indoctrination have shown that they do have some common roots in the secret
police methods of the pre-Communist autocracies in both countries and that both
are heavily influenced by basic principles of Party organization, but also that
they diverge in important respects from each other, and that the common connec-
tions to Pavlovian psychology are very doubtful (Kinkle & Wolff, 1956; Lifton,
1956; Bauer, 1957; Schein, 1959). Where the Soviets have put emphasis on con-
fession extraction to justify public trials prior to eliminating the victim,
the Chinese have from the beginning emphasized the role of confession extraction
as only one step in the rehabilitation and reform of the prisoner; where the
Soviets have traditionally isolated the prisoner and undermined his resistance
by depriving him of any social contact, the crux of the Chinese approach has
been to immerse the prisoner in a small group of other prisoners who are as or
more advanced in their reform than he; where Soviet methods have suggested
scientific and Machiavellian approaches to interrogation and confession extrac-
tion, the Chinese methods have suggested the image of a zealous enthusiastic
mass movement sweeping converts into its ranks by virtue of its intrinsic
* There is some evidence that Pavlov was especially revered during Stalin's
later years because of Stalin's personal desires to advance Pavlovian psychology,
but that following Stalin's death there has been a steady decline of interest in
Pavlov among Soviet psychologists. However, they often find it expedient to
translate work which has only remote connections to Pavlovian psychology into
Pavlovian terminology or to preface their work with praise of Pavlov, thus giving
the impression of a steady monolithic growth of Pavlovianism (Tucker, 1956;
Mintz, 1958).
message and reliance on practical knowledge of interpersonal manipulation.
Because the Chinese methods, best described by the label "coercive persua-
sion," are relatively less known and because the term "brainwashing" applies
most appropriately to them, the remainder of this paper will concern itself with
reviewing some of the salient findings about Chinese handling of captive groups --
the history of their methods, the actual methods employed, the kinds of target
groups involved, the degree of success of the effort, and some attempt to explain
theoretically why some Westerners were influenced.
The Persuasion Theme in the Development of the Chinese Communist Party
It is the attempt to reform its enemies and prisoners -- to cure the disease
and save the man -- which distinguishes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from
other Communist parties. This emphasis on persuasion, rehabilitation, and re-
form can be related to a number of features in CCP history.
Mao's Peasant Base of Support. Because of the absence of a powerful urban
proletariat, Mao, as early as 1925, began to organize a revolution based on
peasant support. Although a revolution based on peasant origins had been con-
sidered by Lenin, it was a major premise of Marxist ideology that proper class
consciousness could only be found in the urban proletariat; peasant origins
should lead to the antithesis of the desired Communist attitude because of
assumed conservatism deriving from the close ties of the peasant to the land.
In organizing peasants, therefore, Mao was led to a "total inversion of certain
Marxist pre-suppositions. Instead of deducing ideological tendencies from class
affiliations, they (the CCP leadership) decided to deduce class affiliations
from ideological tendencies." (Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 1952). If, through
the use of specific ideological appeals such as the fanning of the grievances of
the peasant toward his landlords, one could persuade the peasant to the acceptance
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of Communist premises, the peasant would by definition become a Communist regard-
less of actual social origins.
Mao's success in organizing peasants proved the correctness of the assump-
tion that Communist premises could be learned, an assumption which was of course
strongly supported by the experiences of the leaders themselves, most of whom did
not qualify by social origin as members of the proletariat (Mao's own origin
was on a farm in the province of Hunan). The assumption that even persons with
incorrect social origins could learn the Communist ideology, and, on the other
hand, that even persons with correct social origins could unlearn what presumably
their class status had bestowed upon them, is, of course, at the heart of the
Chinest Communist preoccupation with re-education and reform.
Replenishing Manpower During the Civil War. The recruitment of converts
from initiall y hostile groups was necessary for the CCP's survival and to this
end the CCP developed increasingly effective means of coercive persuasion. From
Kuomintang (KMT) defectors, prisoners of war, and uneducated rural or urban youth
the CCP was able to build up an effectively indoctrinated Red Army and party
organization.
By treating prisoners lenie tly and emphasizing to them that leniency would
continue so long as they were willing to re-educate themselves, the CCP was able
to obtain many genuine converts to Communism. The CCP would emphasize that the
prisoner was only misguided and that his bourgeois background would not be held
against him if he was prepared to confess, accept the "truth" about his criminal
past, and learn the truth about the ultimate path to peace and prosperity through
Communism.
The Exigencies of_ Guerrilla Warfare. The blockade strategy of the KlAT in the
early 1930's and of the Japanese in the 1940's forced the Red Army to become
primarily a guerrilla operation using hit-and-run tactics. The very nature of
5.
these operations required extensive decentralization of administration authority,
a wide scattering of forces, and total dependence for basic supplies of food on
the local peasantry. "If the masses in any area disliked Communist policy enough
to stop giving active support to the local Communist army, that army would be
defeated." (Lindsay, 1950, p. 25). To insure active support, the Communists had
to rely on persuasion and on constant adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology to
the local situation. Because of extensive decentralization, even the rank-and-file
had to have an adequate working knowledge of Communism and had to learn how to
persuade others to it. The growing number of "experts" in the arts of persuasion,
of course, proved to be crucial after the take-over when mass indoctrination of
the Chinest population became possible.
Education in "Liberated" Areas and Coalition Government. The CCP found
itself in control of areas of China early in its history, providing the opportunity
for the initiation of programs of literacy training and "cultural" education. Such
programs made possible effective political tutelage through devices such as teach-
ing initially those characters which would make possible the reading of Communist
slogans, fanning areas of discontent with the old system, introducing into educa-
tion the rudiments of Communist ideology, and so on. Such efforts were partly
designed to insure Communist victories at the polls if control by force had to
be relinquished.
In order to aid the defeat of the Japanese and to build the strength of the
CCP, Mao chose to enter into a coalition government with the KMT and to adopt a
"united front" strategy. Having committed himself to sharing control with other
parties, he could not rely on coercion to insure that his party would remain in
control. The strength of local militias in many parts of China made the winning
of such control by force an expensive operation in any case. Mao chose to try to
persuade such village militias to work with him and to rely on political tutelage
to insure his continued control.
The Cheng Feng (Party Reform) Movement. The decentralization of responsi-
bility for carrying the ideology to the masses of China during the growth of the
movement was not without inevitable problems. The severest of these was appar-
ently the deviations which crept into the thinking of the local cadres, cut off
as they were from central party authority in much of their activity. The estab-
lishment of a secure headquarters in Yenan during the late 1930's provided the
opportunity in the 1940's to launch the Party Reform movement for the "correc-
tion of unorthodox tendencies.". The approach which was to be used differed
sharply from that used in the purge as it had developed in the Soviet Union, in
the emphasis on moral suasion and re-indoctrination rather than on the identifi-
cation and liquidation of deviants.
All members of the CCP and all cadres were expected to participate in self-
examination and mutual help to identify and rectify deviationist tendencies in
thought and action, and this rectification was to be accomplished by non-violent
means. The methods used in this program were built on those developed in the
early history of the movement and foreshadowed the treatment which was to be
accorded to United Nations prisoners of war a decade later:
1) the encouragement of grievances against any and all non-Communist groups
or ideas combined with a strong emphasis on highly acceptable positive ideals
(e.g., get rid of corrupt landlords to help reconstruct China, fight foreign
aggression from the Japanese to win China for its own people, etc.);
2) heavy reliance on group discussion in an atmosphere demanding of each
member a complete exposure of his thought and feeling to the scrutiny and
analysis of others;
3) the use of mutual and self-criticism to stimulate self-examination and
to facilitate competition among group members in exposure of self and others
with the aim of denigrating and destroying all emotional ties with the past;
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4) systematic reward by group leaders and group members of self-exposure,
confession and self-criticism, thus affirming the policy that any man was re-
deemable provided he was willing to allow his "reactionary tendencies" to be
exorcised;
5) the teaching of Communist doctrine in a group setting in which the
group became a vehicle for the thinking through of ideological material to
initially stated conclusions, and in which it was each member's responsibility
to find the meaning of the theoretical material for his own concrete case --
thus bringing theory and action into line with each other;
6) an unmistakable threat of expulsion from the Party for anyone not
willing to engage in reform, to re-educate himself.
What is distinctive in this approach is the sophistication of the CCP in
the use of social and interpersonal forces in the service of creating a situa-
tion in which persuasion was likely to be successful. Given that the individual
could be coerced into exposing himself to the kinds of group forces described
briefly above, it was highly likely that he would come to accept firmly the
premises and attitudes which the leaders espoused.
In summary, coercive persuasion and the use of group forces was born of
the necessity to win over neutral and hostile elements when the CCP was as yet
too weak to impose control by force, but it became an effective working tool
of the growing movement and came, with the take-over, to be one of the CCP's
most salient characteristics as an approach to social control.
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Thought Reform After the Take-Over on the Mainland
The CCP approach to organizing and controlling the large Chinese population
has been to rely on a complex mixture of coercion and persuasion. The CCP
leadership has certainly been willing to use as much terror as was necessary to
establish control and to launch certain key programs like Land Reform. They
have also revived the pao chia system of mutual surveillance by making each citi-
zen responsible for several others and demanding that any degree of deviation
in thought or action from the party line be immediately reported to the authori-
ties. At the same time, "a tremendous amount of energy is devoted to propagandiz-
ing, educating, indoctrinating, and in effect trying to convert the Chinese people.
The fiction is consistently maintained that virtually everything that people are
forced to do is done 'voluntarily' and the spectacle of people 'enthusiastically'
doing things which are obviously in conflict with their own personal interests
is one of the most remarkable phenomena observable in China." (Barnett, 1956,
p. 125).
To support their attempts to indoctrinate the population, the CCP has made
all mass media of communication an extension of the party propaganda apparatus.
Information coming from the West is carefully censored and the party line is
promulgated through careful coordination of all possible media -- newspapers,
movies, radio, loudspeakers in public places, dramatic productions, cartoons,
comics, magazines, books, pamphlets, paintings, posters, dances, songs, and vil-
lage story tellers. Supplementing these audio-visual techniques is an elaborate
oral agitation network designed to reach the high number of illiterates. "The
organized propaganda apparatus is so extensive that the Chinese Communists claim
that during special campaigns they can mobilize fifteen per cent of the total
population actively to propagandize the remaining eighty-five per cent."
(Barnett, 1956, p. 126).
Such widespread campaigns as "Land Reform" (1950), "Resist America, Aid
Korea," (1950), "Three-Anti (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism
in government and party)," (1952), and "Ideological Remolding" (1952, 1957, and
1958) have served to mobilize the Chinese population behind the government and
have further faciliated indoctrination. For our purposes it is the ideological
remolding or thought reform drives which are of greatest interest because the
techniques involved in them have come most consistently to be associated with
the idea of brainwashing.
Thought reform was implemented throughout China through the use of groups
devoted to criticism, self-criticism, accusation, "grievance telling," discussion,
and study, usually led by party cadre who reported to higher authorities on the
progress of members of the group.
Study groups averaging in size from 10 to 12 were organized in every village,
school, factory, jail, farm, etc. to rationalize material presented through
reading or lecture and to make it possible for each member to think through how
the theoretical point might apply to his own case. "Discussion within the
group is often prolonged and intense. Members can, and in fact are expected
to raise doubts about the official 'correct' view on any subject; but when this
happens all other members are expected to argue in favor of the official line.
The final objective is mutual agreement and unanimous support of the official
line." (Barnett, 1966, p. 127).
Accusation meetings were usually held in neighborhoods, villages, farms,
-or -cooperatives for the purpose of mobilizing grievances against the Kl.!f, land,-
lords, feudalism, and most of all, American imperialism. By having individuals
tell their life history and by suitably timing their own accusations, skilled
activists could build up emotions in the group to fever pitch which sometimes
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resulted directly in the trial and perhaps execution of a "cruel landlord" or
"corrupt official."
Criticism and self-criticism was often conducted as part of the study group.
Everyone in the group was expected to write out a detailed autobiography (the
illiterates could always find scribes to whom to dictate their life story) as a
basis for pinpointing sources of reactionary tendencies in his past and as prepar-
ation for revealing his "innermost" thoughts to the group. When the life histories
were discussed critically in the group, the cadre or activist skillfully blended
together political ideology with moralistic principles. Thus, to be a good
Communist in the end was tantamount to being unselfish, modest, considerate, willing
to take responsibility and so on, each defined, of course, in terms of the person's
relationship to the government. To be unselfish meant to be willing to pay ever
higher taxes to the government.
In meetings like these it was usually impossible to hide true feelings under
the scrutiny of other group members who were competing with each other in the
amount of "help" they could give in uncovering basic feelings and attitudes. The
growing intimacy of members made it easier for them to see through rationaliza-
tions and other defenses, which forced each member into a genuine reappraisal
of his own past and heightened the likelihood that he would discover positive
features in an ideology which he knew he must accept anyway.
A more intensive form of thought reform was in evidence in the Revolutionary
Universities which served as training grounds for cadres (Gourlay, 1952; Lifton,
1957). Promising young people would be recruited by methods ranging from elabor-
ate promises of bright futures to virtual forced conscription and put through
intensive indoctrination programs of several months' duration. Again a heavy
emphasis was given to self-examination and confession in the context of small
group discussion, with the aim of producing a genuine severance of all emotional
ties to the past and a rebuilding of the student's self-image in terms of the
new Communist society. As in other kinds of rites de passage, the student rati-
fied his growing new identity by acts such as public denunciation of his father.
For those "students" who proved themselves to be recalcitrant or who needed
a more "fundamental" kind of re-education, as well as for professionals, intellec-
tuals, and party members whose occupations might make their class-consciousness
too parochial, there was "reform through labor." Though reform through labor was
rationalized as the best way quickly to acquire the proletariat point of view, it
seems generally to have been perceived as punishment and to have been viewed as
little more than slave labor to be avoided at all costs.
For those individuals (whether Chinese or foreigner) who were accused of
or suspected of counter-revolutionary activity there were many kinds of prisons.
However, it is noteworthy that the thought reform movement also permeated the
prison, resulting in the assumption that the inmates should and could be reformed.
The whole reform scheme emphasized that the prisoner should be treated leniently
no matter how serious his alleged crime, and should be urged to confess and change
his point of view. Leniency, of course, was accorded only to the prisoner who
sincerely cooperated with the authorities in his own rehabilitation and reform.
Conclusion
What were the purposes of this extensive effort to indoctrinate and what
success was achieved by the regime? The avowed purpose of thought reform was to
create a "new man" whose basic character and attitudes would be ideally fitted
for the Communist society of the future. For the different target groups who
become involved in thought reform this usually meant the adoption of certain
specific attitudes as well as an underlying set of Communist premises -- the
peasant had to adopt "correct" attitudes about having his land collectivized,
the businessman about having the government expropriate him, the bourgeois
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reactionary about having to give up his emotional ties to parents, friends, and
sometimes spouses if the latter were considered t' be political liabilities.
The political prisoner was expected to undergo a more fundamental re-evaluation
of his past life and to recognize how various of his activities had been harmful
to "the people." The major implicit purposes of thought reform appeared to be
the creation of obedient citizens and cadres, and the conversion of an entrenched
bureaucracy and intelligentsia into an arm of the Communist state. In a sense
thought reform was an elaborate initiation rite which everyone who wished to
acquire any status in the new Communist society had to undergo.
The success of the regime in fulfilling its purposes is difficult to evalu-
ate. The visible effect of thought reform in combination with the coercive
apparatus upon which it rests had been the creation of massive conformity in all
sectors of Chinese society. Almost every visitor to Communist China has been
struck by the degree to which all citizens look alike, speak alike, and act
alike (e.g., Guillain, 1957). It has also been observed that the disciplined
efforts of masses of the population have led to a number of tangible accomplish-
ments -- increased productivity in some areas of the economy, military success
in Korea, and the eradication of certain vices ("there are no more beggars on
the streets of Peking").
There is little doubt that the ascetic, moralistic, and idealistic tone
of the message of thought reform has had a strong impact on a serious younger
generation bent upon bringing the "New China" into the front ranks of world
powers. On the other hand, there are a number of indications that thought
reform has not gone deep in influencing attitudes -- the burst of criticism
which followed Mao's Let 100 Flowers Bloom speech, the reports of defectors
that group discussion, study, criticism, and self-criticism are engaged in
only superficially, and the high number of unreconstructed critics in the
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political prisons (as estimated by Western repatriates). The safest conclusion
is that the effects of thought reform have been uneven -- the effects have been
different on different parts of Chinese society and have been a function of the
skill and sophistication of the cadres responsible for it. For example, almost
all of the cases of successful reform of Western prisoners come from the Peking
prison and at least part of the reason seems to be the more highly motivated
and skilled prison personnel.
The Involvement of Western Prisoners
Westerners became involved with Chinese Communist thought reform in two
ways: several hundred European and American professionals, businessmen, and
missionaries were arrested on the mainland and subjected to reform in prison,
and several thousand United Nations prisoners of war (PaWs) encountered a some-
what milder version in the POW camps of North Korea. The arrests on the mainland
probably occurred for a number of reasons -- to break spy rings which the
Communists believed to be operating, to facilitate propaganda operations by dis-
crediting Western efforts in China, to expropriate the properties of Westerners,
to collect hostages for political negotiations, and to assert Asian superiority
over a group to which the Chinese had felt inferior for so long. It is quite
unlikely that any of the arrests occurred in order to subject the prisoner to
thought reform; rather the reform was a regular part of prison procedure and
had to involve all prisoners.
The same thought reform emphasis also operated within the Red Army and led
to the routine attempts to indoctrinate POWs in Korea. In these cases alao-one-
gets the feeling that thought reform was incidental rather than basic, with the
basic purpose being the exploitation of the PW for a variety of propaganda
objectives. Thus the germ warfare confessions and the variety of collaborative
behaviors engaged in by the PWs were not basically related to brainwashing, if
by that term one understands the whole methodology associated with thought reform.
The lectures, group discussion, autobiography writing, and criticism sessions
built around the general "lenient approach" certainly aided the Chinese in elicit-
ing collaborative behavior on the part of the POW, but most of such behavior was
related more immediately to the need for physical and psychological survival than
to the acceptance of any portion of Communist ideology.
Treatment of Western Civilians in Prisons
The treatment of civilians in prison varied widely depending upon the loca-
tion of the prison, the political climate, and the nature of the alleged crime
(Schein, 1961). The most refined thought reform was in evidence in the Peking
prison from whence came most of the cases of alleged successful brainwashing.
The changes in the beliefs, attitudes, and values which the prison regimen pro-
duced (which in some cases were substantial and lasting) can only be accounted
for by a consideration of all the pressures which the total experience generated,
even though some of these pressures were incidental to the thought reform pro-
gram as such.
The initial attitude of the prisoner was important. If he had seen only
the good side of Communism, as gxhibited in the admirable take-over operation
in cities like Peking, he was more likely to accept the "lenient policy" and
thus become favorably disposed toward Chinese Communist penal methods. If he
had seen the brutal side of Communism as in the Land Reform movement, he was
usually predisposed to believe nothing the Communists said and to resist any
impulse to be favorably disposed toward them.
Arrest usually followed a period of surveillance and resulted in the pris-r
oner s either being detained in his own house or being taken to some form of
prison. He was usually not told the charges against him, yet it was made clear
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to him that he was considered to be guilty from the moment of arrest on. Once
arrepted, he was expected to come to understand the following version of his
predicament: he was in prison because the government considered him a criminal;
his crime was obvious to everyone but to him; his first task was to understand
the nature of his crime and in this task the authorities and fellow prisoners
would do all they could to help him; through analysis of his past behavior he
would be shown and would discover how the ultimate consequences of his actions
had been harmful to the Chinese people. Once he saw his guilt, he was expected
to confess, repent, and reform the undesirable thoughts, attitudes, feelings and
actions which had led to his crimes in the first place.
From the Communist point of view guilt was judged "objectively," which
meant that anything which ultimately could have harmed the Chinese people was
a crime even if unintended or not acted upon. Thus a prisoner might be con-
sidered guilty because of his associations, his alleged intentions, his incor-
rect thoughts or attitudes, and, most importantly, his incorrect social origins.
If he was other than proletarian by birth he was considered to have acquired
incorrect points of view and attitudes throughout his life which eventually
would result in harmful action toward the common people.
From the prisoner's point of view his arrest was unjustified, the accusa-
tions of guilt in the initial confrontation with judge or interrogator ridiculous,
and the statements about leniency to those who confess meaningless. Only as
the full force of the prison regimen made itself felt on him did he come to be
able to appreciate intellectually and emotionally what was wanted of him.
The manner in which the prisoner came to be influenced to accept the
Communist 's definition of his guilt can best be described by distinguishing two
broad phases -- 1) a process of "unfreezing," in which the prisoner's physical
resistance, social and emotional supports,self-image and sense of integrity, and
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basic values and personality were undermined, thereby creating a state of
"readiness" to be influenced; and 2) a process of "changing," in which the
prisoner discovered how the adoption of "the people's standpoint" and a re-
evaluation of himself from this perspective would provide him with a solution
to the problems created by the prison pressures. The degree of permanence of
the changes in attitude which had occurred would depend on the degree to which
these were subsequently integrated with other values and attitudes the prisoner
held and were supported by others back home.
Unfreezing
The prisoner's physical strength was undermined by the general inadequacy
of the diet, loss of sleep due to intermittent and continuous interrogation,
illnesses, lack of exercise, excessive cold or heat in combination with inappro-
priate clothing, prolonged standing or squatting during interrogation or as a
punishment for infraction of the prison regulations, excessive pain from the
wearing of manacles behind the back and ankle chains (which were put on as
punishment if the authorities felt that the prisoner was not genuinely trying
to reform himself), cuffing and beating by cell mates, and innumerable other
events in the prison regimen.
The prisoner's social and emotional supports were undermined by his being
completely cut off from any communication with the outside (no incoming or out-
going mail was permitted, and no non-Communist newspapers, etc. were available),
by the prohibition of any close emotional relationship with another prisoner
except in the context of reform, by the introduction of testimonials of various
sorts in the form of confessions by others whom the prisoner respected or simply
by surrounding the prisoner with cell mates who were enthusiastic about reform-
ing themselves and who condemned all the values to which he adhered.
The prisoner's image of himself and his sense of integrity or inviolability
were undermined primarily by the humiliation, revilement, and brutalization he
suffered at the hands of his cell mates in the process of "struggle." Most
prisoners were put into a cell containing several Chinese prisoners who were
further along in reforming themselves and who saw it as their primary duty to
"help" their most backward member to see the truth about himself in order that
the whole cell might advance. Each such cell had a leader who was in close con-
tact with the authorities for purposes of reporting on the cell's progress and
getting advice on how to handle the Western member. In this setting the cell
mates found ways of putting extreme pressure on their unreformed member, partic-
ularly since he was often completely dependent upon them for help in feeding
himself, eliminating, etc. (especially if he were manacled). The only thing
which would satisfy the cell mates was a sincere confession, but since the
prisoner could not guess initially what this meant or what he was to confess,
he brought down the full wrath of the others upon his head. They believed in
his guilt and felt that only his stubbornness and reactionary tendencies could
account for his refusal to confess. The only valid identity granted to him
was that of guilty criminal; any attempt to be anything else -- a doctor, a
missionary, an innocent victim of circumstance -- was condemned violently. The
fact that this pressure was applied twenty-four hours a day for weeks or months
on end must have made it especially potent; there was no private time and no
opportunity for retreat.
Other facets of the environment undermined the prisoner s self-image. The
prisoner was identif'ied only by number; his every action during the day wans_
carefully prescribed -- when to eat, when to go to the toilet, when to wash, etc.
The time allotted to these activities was usually far too short to allow for
their satisfactory completion (e.g., two minutes for running out to the toilet,
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eliminating, and returning at a given time of day); he was prohibited from
making any decisions -- every act had to be preceded by permission from the
guard or coordinated carefully with the cell mates (e.g., since sleeping quar-
ters were crowded, prisoners slept huddled together and all had to shift posi-
tion in unison on an agreed upon signal); Judges and interrogators made a con-
vincing argument that the prisoner could not hope to be released and ever be
anything again unless he confessed and repented; the prisoner was often
seduced into behavior violating his own self-image, such as making attempts at
false confessions or denouncing loved ones. The whole prison atmosphere was
completely demeaning.
Some of these same factors also tended to undermine the prisoner's more
fundamental values and personality defenses. His state of complete dependency
often aroused childhood conflicts and stimulated unconscious guilt; the cell
mates constantly rejected and demeaned the prisoner's values or if these were
strong ethical principles as in the case of priests, showed in many little ways
how the person had in his past or was in his present behavior failing to live up
to the very values he professed (e.g., pointing out that most missions employed
Chinese in "demeaning" jobs such as cooks or houseboys, or that the priest's
behavior in the cell was often selfishly motivated).
Guilt was also aroused by the recognition on the part of prisoners that their
own middle class values did indeed lead them to subtle prejudices against the
working classes and that these prejudices had shown up in their attitudes toward
the Chinese prior to imprisonment (e.g., preference for living in fancy quarters,
social-contacts mostly with the embassy set, etc.). At the same time the values
which the Communists professed are so universally valid as to have been unassail-
able -- unselfishness, working for the greater good of humanity, peace, etc. --
yet are so difficult to uphold in an absolute sense that the prisoner was
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constantly having his failures pointed out to him (e.g., taking up too much room
while sleeping was considered evidence of selfishness reflecting bad bourgeois
attitudes).
Change in Attitudes and Self-image
The constant threats of death or permanent non-repatriation led to anxiety
and despair which was difficult to cope with. But even more difficult for the
prisoner was his increasing recognition that his cell mates really took the
lenient policy of the government seriously and were making a genuine attempt to
reform themselves. As the cell mates came to be seen as real people rather than
merely agents of the prison authorities, the prisoner felt increasingly guilty
for his hostility toward them and increasingly committed to trying to understand
their point of view. Because his own beliefs, values, and attitudes had been
undermined, and because he found himself in an insoluble situation, he became
increasingly disposed to trying to find a solution through forming relationships
with others who seemed to have found a solution. As his identification with one
or more cell mates grew, he came increasingly to understand the basic premises
underlying "the people's standpoint," and how he might be perceived to be guilty
from this standpoint.
Because the prison experiences had elicited a variety of guilt feelings
already, it became possible for the prisoner to attach his guilt feelings in-
creasingly to the crimes which he began to see in his own past behavior, and
thus to begin a process of "sincere" confession. He could see that his innocent
letters about his trip through a farm area could be giving valuable economic
information to the American enemy, that his discussions with people in embassies
concerning the morale of students could be used in psychological warfare against
the Communists, that his hobnobbing with the embassy set was giving aid and
comfort to reactionary forces, or that his failure to join the Communists could
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be construed as hostility toward them. Once this process of self re-evaluation
began, the prisoner received all kinds of help and support from the cell mates
and once again was able to enter into meaningful emotional relationships with
others. His terrible social-emotional isolation was at an end and his role as
repentant sinner was given increasing support.
The key elements in this process were 1) the identifications which formed
with cell mates, thus making it possible for the prisoner to begin to understand
the point of view from which he was judged guilty,: and 2) the re-evaluation of
actual behavior engaged in, which occurred when he applied the scale of values
embodied in "the people's standpoint" to his own behavior. The prisoner was
not expected to manufacture a false confession, but was expected to see that his
actual behavior had in fact been criminal from the Communist point of view.
The intensive self-analysis which accompanied this process often led the
prisoner to recognize genuine faults in his own character and as this happened
his reform took on a personal as well as political meaning. Some of the pris-
oners had come to China uncertain of their basic identity and value systems and
found in the prison experience an opportunity to arrive at some genuine resolu-
tions of long standing conflicts or to become completely committed to some value
system.
The role of the group cell
The role of the group cell in facilitating this process of unfreezing and
attitude change was crucial. The enforced close contact with others made it
likely that strong feelings of guilt, anxiety, and hostility would be generated
which would heighten the probability of some kind of identification with a cell
mate occurring, either as a defense against the stimulation of deeper conflicts
or as a solution to the identity problem which the group cell created. At the
same time, the presence of several others heightened the probability that no
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matter what kind of a defensive maneuver the prisoner tried there would be at
least one other who would, because of his own personality, "see through" and
be able to expose the defense.
The complete unanimity of outlook of several others is, of course, a most
potent group force which is virtually impossible to resist psychologically.
One or two others may be wrong, but when three or more others seem independently
to hold the same views, these views must be taken seriously.
The availability of several others increased the probability that there
would be at least one other who was in terms of background or personality suf-
ficiently similar to the prisoner to facilitate an identification with him.
Once such an identification resulted in some efforts on the part of the prisoner
to change his attitudes, the group provided not only many models of what it was
the prisoner was expected to learn, but it also provided the opportunity for
coaching and tutoring relationships to develop in which rapid "feed-back" could
be obtained by the prisoner on whether he was on the right track or not.
Study, Interrogation, and Trial
The events described thus far were supplemented by study sessions in which
the group cell would start with a lecture or some written material and analyze
it, with criticism and self-criticism meetings, and with autobiography writing,
but these activities did not have genuine impact on the Western prisoner until
he had begun the more fundamental self re-evaluation described above. If the
prisoner were on the road to making a suitable confession and adopting new atti-
tudes toward himself and others in line with the Communist ethic, the study and
*
This conclusion is based on a variety of research of which the most
cogent are the studies of Asch (1951).
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other sessions were very useful in providing rationalizations, theory, and a
broader conception of what Communism meant, as well as acquainting the prisoner
increasingly with Communist semantics.
Throughout his imprisonment, the prisoner was periodically confronted with
interrogation sessions and with discussions of his case in the presence of one
or more judges. The prisoner's relationship to these authorities was not dis-
similar to the heretic's relationship to the inquisitor of the middle ages in
that the case could only be settled when the prisoner had made a suitable con-
fession, suitable being defined by the personal judgment of the authorities,
not by law. Psychologically meaningful relationships also grew up with interro-
gators but not as frequently as with cell mates. Interrogation more often than
not was one of the stresses which tended to unfreeze the prisoner and made him
increasingly search for a solution to his dilemma.
Once the prisoner began to adopt "the people's standpoint" and to apply
this yardstick to his own behavior, he began to be able to confess in a manner
which satisfied the authorities. After varying lengths of time, during which
he might write and rewrite his confession a half dozen times or more, he would
be brought to trial and usually sentenced to imprisonment for a period roughly
approximating the length of time he had already spent in prison, to be followed
by expulsion from China. The confession, then, usually served as the criterion
of the degree of reform, though the authorities also had available to them the
reports of the cell chief on the progress which a given prisoner was making.
The release of Western prisoners was, of course, sometimes dictated more by in-
ternational negotiations than by degree of reform or the adequacy of the con-
fession. Many prisoners were released who apparently never made a damaging
confession, and some were released who made confessions but who obviously did
not adopt "the people's standpoint" (as evidenced by their immediate repudiation
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of the confession following their release by the Communists). Finally, a number
of Western prisoners have been given longer sentences which they are still
serving.
Results
The description of coercive persuasion given above applies only to a small
number of Western prisoners (the number is difficult to estimate for obvious
reasons but is perhaps no larger than 50, taking Americans and Europeans to-
gether). The majority of Westerners who were imprisoned either encountered in-
efficient prisons or were not considered important enough to be reformed. Many
of them encountered reform in a superficial fashion -- study sessions and criti-
cism performed as a necessary daily ritual rather than an important psychological
activity. Many were never placed into group cells of more reformed prisoners,
but were either kept in solitary confinement or placed with other "reactionary"
prisoners with whom they were forbidden to communicate in any way whatsoever.
Successful brainwashing, in the sense of the repatriate espousing Communist atti-
tudes and reiterating his crimes following release from Communist China, was a
rare outcome. Genuine attitude change could only occur if there were already a
predisposition in the prisoner and if he encountered a highly effective prison
regimen built around the use of the group cell.
Those Americans who exhibited Communist influence at the time of their re-
lease into Hong Kong have had varied histories since their release. Several of
them have re-evaluated their experiences once again after their return home and
have ended up wondering how they could ever have believed what they had professed
to believe toward the end of their imprisonment. Several others have vacillated
between sympathy for the Communist position and sympathy for the Western position
and are continuing to search for some resolution to their value and attitude con-
flicts; several have had genuine personality changes built around ethical principles
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which Communism shares with other value systems, and these individuals have con-
tinued to believe that they were guilty of the crimes to which they confessed,
that they were indeed treated leniently by the Communists, that the Communist
position on matters of basic ethics and values is correctand that they must con-
tinue to live by these principles even if they encounter hostility in the United
States. Some have used thought reform as a basis for genuine personal reform and
are grateful to the Chinese for providing this opportunity.
Treatment of Prisoners of War in Korea
The experiences of United Nations (UN) Pls at the hands of the Chinese
Communists reflected the general thought reform emphasis, but because of the
large number of POWs and some specific political goals, the actual events of
imprisonment worked out differently in several respects (Schein, 1956). The
problem which confronted the West with the POWs was not so much their ideologi-
cal conversion, of which there was virtually none, but rather a variety of col-
laborative behaviors (such as making radio broadcasts praising the CCP, signing
"peace" petitions, asking others to cooperate with the enemy, serving on "peace"
committees, making germ warfare confessions, and so on) which the Communists
used skillfully to embarrass the United States in particular during the Korean
episode.
The American POW was completely unprepared for the political exploitation
to which he was subjected, and many of his responses to the Chinese efforts are
to be explained primarily by this lack of preparation. Shortly after the UN's
entry into Korea the primary expectation on the part of the troops was that cap-
ture would result in being tortured, abandoned, or killed by the North Koreans.
Subsequent studies of atrocities in Korea substantiated these rumors in that most
of the brutal treatment of the POW was the result of North Korean handling,
(U.S. Army, 1953).
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Capture by the Chinese
If a man was captured by the Chinese, however, he found instead of harshness
and brutality a friendly welcome, an outstretched hand, and a greeting in broken
English of "Welcome," "Congratulations, you have been liberated," or "You have
now joined the Fighters for Peace." Because many of the men were unclear about
their mission in Korea and resented fighting on foreign soil against an unfamiliar
enemy, they were initially receptive to any mention of peace. The Chinese then
typically gathered groups of prisoners together at collection points and further
explained the "lenient policy": :POWs were not viewed as enemy troops but as
misguided, uneducated, or unawakened people who had been "tricked into fighting
for an evil capitalist society," and who could be brought to see the "truth"
about the Korean war and the basic validity of Communist peace efforts. If a
prisoner was willing to listen to the Communist point of view, to study it, and
to show his sincerity by collaborating with the enemy, he was to be favored and
to be treated as a brother in a common cause. If he refused to "learn the truth,"
he deserved nothing more than harsh treatment, condemnation as a reactionary,
and permanent imprisonment.
The Problem of Survival in Temporary Camps
Most of the men were captured during the winter of 1950-1951, and the first
months of captivity were a tough struggle for survival. Apparently the Chinese
were unwilling or unable to create adequately supplied POW compounds in time to
take care of the large number of POWs they captured, resulting in a marginal
diet for Western soldiers, a high rate of illness which was inadequately treated,
l.ack of medical care for the wounded, and extensive exposure to the elements.
This combination of circumstances resulted in more than 40 percent of the POWs
dying within the first six months of captivity.
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Psychologically this was a most difficult time for the POW because the
marginal conditions stimulated competition for the scarce resources available,
morale was low anyway because of the uncertain future which capture by an
Oriental enemy signalled, and the Chinese repeatedly protested that the inade-
quate supplies of food and medicine resulted from UN bombing of supply lines,
not from their own deliberate policy or callousness. They were always highly
solicitous and sympathetic, which robbed the prisoners of the opportunity to
band together around their common hatred of the enemy. The fact that there
were among the large number of prisoners some who, from the outset, were willing
to take advantage of others or to curry the favor of the Chinese created an addi-
tional morale problem which the Chinese, of course, exacerbated by offering
more and better food and medicine to those prisoners who showed a willingness
to cooperate with them.
The men were marched north and housed in various kinds of temporary com-
pounds during this winter and were moved into more permanent POW compounds along
the banks of the Yalu during the spring of 1951. Shelter, food supplies, medical
care, and clothing improved sharply with the settling into the permanent com-
pounds, but psychological pressures did not cease because of the manner in which
the Chinese organized and operated the camps.
Deliberate Disorganization of POWs in Permanent Camps
The most significant feature of Chinese prison camp control was the system-
atic destruction of the POW formal and informal group structure which in the end
resulted in widespread mutual mistrust among the men and the necessity for each
man to withdraw increasingly into a shell even though he was in the midst of
others.
The authority structure of the POW group was destroyed first by segregating
all officers and later all non-commissioned officers, thus leaving the mass of
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prisoners without formal authority of any kind. The prisoners were organized
into squads, platoons, and companies but only the squads were commanded by
prisoners and the squad leaders were usually the lowest ranking enlisted men
or prisoners who were willing to cooperate with the Chinese. All these measures
were justified to the men in terms of the premise that military rank has no sig-
nificance under Communism and it was the working man who should be given the
authority to command.
Communist sophistication in destroying group cohesion had been shown in
the earlier period also when units or large groups of POWs including all ranks
were still together. For example, the highest ranking officers would be given
the alternative of signing a peace petition and ordering their troops to sign
or having their group punished severely. Attempts by the ranking officers to
work out compromises which would satisfy the Chinese yet would increase the
chances of the survival of their men would often appear to lower ranking officers
like collaboration. They would then either overtly or covertly fail to obey
orders, thus destroying the chain of command and, in effect, throwing the troops
on their own resources.
The informal social structure of the POW group was undermined by a variety
of techniques: 1) the Chinese prohibited any form of organized activity not
sponsored by themselves, including religious services and recreational activities;
2) emergent leaders were usually discovered and segregated; 3) extensive use of
spies and POW informers made possible close surveillance of all informal activi-
ties and the Chinese frequently let POWs know that even their most private conver-
sations and plans wereknown, thus creating mutual mistrust since no one could-
be sure that his best friends were not informers; 4) the conduct of interrogations
weakened social-emotional ties still further by the frequent presentation to a man
of confessions or military information written out by a fellow prisoner; what he
usually did not know is that the fellow prisoner had not provided the information
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voluntarily but had perhaps agreed to copy it out of some manuals which the
Chinese showed him they already possessed; written information of this sort
was often widely publicized in camp newspapers to create the impression that
collaboration was the rule rather than the exception; 5) the confessions of
germ warfare which were coerced from a number of Air Force officers and enlisted
men were exploited by forcing several of them to go to the POW damps to give lec-
tures on how they had used germ warfare, usually creating a big impression on
the listeners.
As in the case of the civilian prisoner, bonds to loved ones and to the
home country were severed by the prohibition of any contact with the outside.
Only pro-Communist literature was avilable in the prison camp libraries; mail
was delivered to a prisoner only if it contained bad news or was completely
innocuous; if a man inquired about his mail he was usually told that none had
arrived, which must mean that his loved ones had abandoned him.
Most of the POWs were forced to write autobiographies and to discuss details
of their personal histories during lengthy interrogations. It would be pointed
out to a man how any misfortune or difficulty he reported must be the product
of the political system under which he grew up, a message which found a respon-
sive chord in the drifters and malcontents and in those prisoners whose enlist-
ment in the Army had, in the first place, been motivated by their failure to
achieve any other kind of satisfactory occupational career.
Criticism and self-criticism could not be introduced directly into POW
groups without it becoming a mere mockery of what was intended, but it was used
effectively to embarrass individual POWs and thereby to weaken the morale of
the whole group. For example, most men were required to sign lengthy camp rules
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shortly after their arrival at a permanent compound. Months later a man might
be hauled to the camp commandant's office and accused of a serious crime like
expectorating at a forbidden place. He then would be told that to avoid serious
punishment he must make a public confession and self-criticism in front of his
company or squad. Though the man usually managed to introduce enough idiom into
such a procedure to ridicule it, the impact on other POWs of seeing a fellow
prisoner humiliate himself was still considerable.
Rewards, Threats and Punishments
Rewards and punishments were consistently manipulated to elicit collabora-
tive behavior. Any tendency on the part of a POW to be cooperative with the
Chinese was rewarded with increased food rations or luxury items like fresh
fruit or cigarettes; any stiffening of resistance was punished with a decrease
in food, medicine, or camp privileges, and, if resistance was chronic, led to
segregation in special compounds for "reactionaries" in which hard labor was the
typical activity. Threats of death or non-repatriation, occasionally backed by
mock executions or severe physical punishment, effectively curbed any violent
resistance efforts. The memory of the horrors of the first six months kept alive
the knowledge that the Communists were more than willing to let men die or kill
them if it suited their purpose.
Prizes of food would be given for essays to be published in the camp news-
papers and the winning essay would invariably be the one which was most pro-
Communist. Perhaps the most important reward for cooperation with the enemy was
the status of "progressive," symbolized by being given a peace dove to wear in
the lapel, which made it possible for the POW once again to enter into meaningful
social relationships with others and to obtain a whole range of special privileges
such as freedom of movement. For POWs who had not enjoyed any status in the
society from which they came, such a status could be very meaningful even though
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based on cooperation with the enemy.
Lectures and Group Discussion
To present the Communist point of view and to provide the POs with suitable
reasons for why they should cooperate with the Chinese, the political sections
of the Red Army units presented daily lectures to be followed by group discussions
of the conclusions presented in the lecture. Attendance at both functions was
mandatory and the group discussions were monitored by cadres or by "progressives."
The content of the lectures was usually crude propaganda around topics like
"Who Really Started the Korean War?" and was so full of blatant inaccuracies as
to vitiate whatever appeal it might have had (e.g., the statement by the lecturer
that "we know that in America very few of you own your own cars"). Certain
specific themes like the plea for "peace" inevitably had appeal, however, and
PCWs found themselves supporting peace activities like signing petitions, insert-
ing peace propaganda into their letters home (they, were delivered only if such
propaganda were inserted), and serving on peace committees which were formed in
each camp.
Results
What were the results of these various activities? The most important result
was the social disorganization of the POW group which resulted in the bulk of the
men withdrawing into an emotional shell and adapting as best they could by coop-
erating with the Chinese as much as they had to to survive but trying to avoid
giving any aid to their propaganda efforts. The extent of this psychological
withdrawal showed up clearly in studies of the repatriates. In their observable
behavior and on psychological tests they showed marked emotional constriction,
inability and unwillingness to get involved with others, and even some impairment
of intellectual functioning (Strassman, Thaler & Schein, 1956; Schein, Hill,
Williams & Lubin, 1957; Singer & Schein, 1958). It took a period of weeks or
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months in some cases for the men once again to feel comfortable in close emotional
relationships with others.
An important corollary result was the impairment of judgment which resulted
from the social-emotional isolation. If a POW could not comfortably discuss
his daily affairs with others, seek advice, or consider the consequences of
actions he was contemplating, he was cut off from the most important source of
validation available to man -- the opinions, beliefs, and knowledge of others.
Much of the collaborative behavior of the POWs was unwitting or was based on very
poor foresight. They often were unaware how skilled the Communists were in using
propaganda and were equally unaware how their behavior might be construed as
disloyal. The important point, however, is that collaborative behavior was
usually not motivated by disloyalty or opportunitism, but rather was the complex
resultant of attempts to survive in an environment where standards for behavior
were extrem'ely difficult to discern.
Statistics on the amount of collaboration among captured Americans have
varied with the criterion that was applied all the way from 70 percent to 10
percent of the POWs committing one or more acts of collaboration. These statis-
tics become meaningless if one considers the ambiguity of the criterion and the
difficulty the men had judging what was actually collaboration. What they do
indicate,however, is that from the Chinese Communist point of view their efforts
to produce propaganda must have seemed quite successful. On the other hand,
the very small percentage of men who were to any degree swayed by the ideological
message of the Communists must be considered a dramatic failure of their indoc-
trination program.
In managing the prison camps with a minimum of guards, the Communists were
highly successful. The isolation of the camps, the ready identifiability of
Westerners among the North Koreans, the social disorganization of the PCW group,
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and the fact that the armistice talks were going from early 1951 on all mili-
tated against extensive escape activities. Numerous escapes were attempted but
in most cases the men were recovered after a fairly short time.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to survey some of the techniques used by the
Chinese Communists on various target populations in their attempt to win converts
to Communism. Because the Communists themselves do not have completely standard-
ized methods of operation it has been impossible to be exhaustive in this analysis,
but an attempt has been made to describe the salient features of what has come
to be labelled as brainwashing.
The outstanding conclusion one comes away with from a study of these events
is that the methods of brainwashing are not diabolical, new , or irresistible.
Rather, the Chinese have drawn on their cultural sensitivity to the nuances of
interpersonal relationships to put together some highly effective but well-known
techniques of indoctrination. Their sophistication about the importance of the
small group as a mediator of opinions and attitudes has led to some highly ef-
fective techniques of destroying group solidarity, as in the case of the POWs,
and of using groups as a mechanism of changing attitudes, as in the political
prisons. They have gone to tremendous efforts to influence the attttudes of
any captive audience which has become available to them and have had some im-
pressive results. But it remains a question whether the handful of individuals
influence in prisons and the propaganda obtained in the POW camps, given the
tremendous effort expended in obtaining it, warrant the conclusion that brain-
washing is a dangerousweapon in the Communist arsenal. My own opinion is that
the events described above are of far greater significance to the social
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scientist for whom they represent some fascinating natural experiments in atti-
tude change, than they are to the policy maker or to those concerned with the
politics or the conflict between ideologies. The student of Communist China
should, however, watch closely the ultimate effects of thought reform on the
Chinese population itself. It is possible that the Chinese have been far more
successful than other totalitarian regimes in recent history in selling their
ideology to the general population.
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